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'Didden v. Port Chester': 
Placing Eminent Domain Debate in Proper Perspective 
 
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal 
February 21, 2007 
 
John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher 
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel to its Land 
Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies.  Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace 
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.]   
 
Abstract: Controversy often arises when landowners in blighted areas resist 
government driven urban-renewal condemnation of their property.  Often, these 
urban-renewal areas, the scope of which is determined after extensive study, are 
condemned and transferred to a private developer who has an overall plan for 
the entire designated area.  This article discusses the issues that arise when 
private property interests are overridden by public interests and how urban 
renewal will help revitalize the economies of troubled inner-city regions.   
 
*** 
 
When the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 16, 2007 in 
the case of Didden v. Port Chester, it extinguished the last hope of a property 
owner whose land development aspirations were frustrated by the urban renewal 
process.  No. 06-652, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1036 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007).  The case has 
attracted a fraction of the media attention of the Kelo v. New London case in 
which the Court upheld the taking of private property for the public purpose of 
pursuing an area-wide development project under Connecticut's municipal 
development statute.  545 U.S. 469 (2005); see CONN. GEN STAT. § 8-186.  The 
Didden case, like Kelo, is consistent with decided precedent; however, both 
cases raise public policy concerns regarding the reach of the power of eminent 
domain.    
 
Didden and his partners owned various adjoining parcels that were partly 
inside and partly outside the Village of Port Chester’s formally-established urban 
renewal area.   They made plans to develop their property as a CVS Pharmacy, 
sought and received various development approvals from local land use boards, 
and entered into a lease with CVS.  In order to proceed with their development, 
they had to secure the release of the parcels that were inside the urban renewal 
area from village constraints.  The village had designated G & S Port Chester 
LLC the redeveloper of the urban renewal area giving it control over the use of all 
land within the area.  Negotiations between the Didden group and G & S failed 
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and the village then approved the condemnation of the inside properties allowing 
G & S to develop them in accordance with the village’s adopted urban renewal 
plan.  Didden sued seeking a stay of the condemnation proceedings as well as 
declaratory and monetary relief. Didden v. Port Chester, 304 F. Supp. 2d 548 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Didden v. Port Chester, 322 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York was asked 
to declare that the condemnation of the Didden property pursued a private 
interest, that of G & S, rather than a public purpose as required by the Fifth 
Amendment.  
 
Both Port Chester and New London are small, distressed communities 
with a history of high poverty and unemployment in the midst of surrounding 
affluence. Port Chester had attempted various revitalization strategies in its 27-
acre downtown and waterfront area without success for over 20 years before 
designating G & S as the qualified and eligible developer of the area in 1998.  
Consistent with General Municipal Law provisions, Port Chester adopted an 
urban renewal plan calling for the development of the land in phases and entered 
into a Land Acquisition and Disposition Agreement (LADA) with G & S enabling it 
to acquire and redevelop the property. The plan called for the provision of 
approximately 500,000 square feet of retail establishments including a Costco 
warehouse store, movie theater, department store, Bed, Bath & Beyond, and a 
number of additional stores and enterprises.  The goal was to provide jobs, 
increase the limited tax base of the village, and stimulate economic revitalization 
in the surrounding areas.  By the time the Court denied certiorari early this year, 
development pursuant to the urban renewal plan was well underway.  
 
The policy behind urban renewal is to jump-start stalled local economies in 
order to restore economic and social health for the benefit of the citizenry, 
including low- and moderate-income families, which tend to congregate in urban 
settlements.  The public harm caused by blighted urban conditions is extensive 
and well documented; it is the aim of urban renewal to restore health to 
communities through blight removal strategies such as Port Chester’s.  The 
intransigence of urban blight explains, in part, the extraordinary powers 
delegated to municipalities under urban renewal law. The power of government 
to delegate the implementation of redevelopment plans to publicly-selected 
private companies recognizes the complexity of land acquisition and 
redevelopment financing and execution: a job better undertaken by experienced 
development companies than by public bodies.  Blight elimination and urban 
revitalization are the public purposes that justify the taking of private property 
under the Fifth Amendment and comparable provisions of state law.  
 
Municipalities in New York receive their urban renewal powers under 
Articles 15 and 15-A of the General Municipal Law.  Under these provisions, 
municipalities are authorized to conduct blight studies, define the boundaries of 
blighted neighborhoods, designate them as urban renewal areas, draft and 
approve an urban renewal plan, issue a request for proposals from private 
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developers interested in building pursuant to the plan, designate a qualified and 
eligible redeveloper, and then authorize that redeveloper to acquire parcels in the 
area and develop them in accordance with the plan.  Should any of the private 
parcel owners in the area not be willing to sell their land voluntarily, the 
municipality, or its urban renewal agency, is authorized by Article 15 and 15-A to 
acquire those parcels by eminent domain.   
 
All of these steps must be taken following public notice and public hearing 
and are subject to judicial review.  All procedures and standards contained in 
New York’s Eminent Domain Procedures Law (EDPL) must be followed in 
condemning title to properties in urban renewal areas. Pursuant to these 
provisions, the Village of Port Chester provided public notice of a public hearing 
on the adoption of the urban renewal plan. Following the public hearing, on July 
14, 1999, the board of trustees adopted a resolution making a finding of public 
purpose under Article 2 of the EDPL, approving the LADA, and designating G & 
S as the qualified and eligible redeveloper for the urban renewal project.  The 
project called for the acquisition of over 38 properties.   
 
EDPL § 207 allows affected landowners to appeal the public purpose 
findings of a condemning authority within 30 days.  The Didden group’s judicial 
action, which was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was commenced in January, 
2004. The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in New York is three 
years.  When the statute of limitations accrues is a question of federal law. 
 
The district court noted that the Didden group proceeded with its CVS 
project, including securing local land use approvals, knowing that G & S had the 
authority to buy or have the village condemn its parcels.  Didden, 304 F. Supp. 
2d at 553.  The group met several times with G & S to try to negotiate an 
arrangement that would allow them to proceed with their agreement with CVS.  
Plaintiffs allege that during these negotiations G & S demanded that they pay 
$800,000 as the price for releasing the land from its control.  Didden alleged that 
G & S used its authority under the LADA to seek condemnation of the property to 
extort funds.  G & S argued that the parties negotiated reasonably about the 
value of the CVS venture and explored options for pursuing it. These 
negotiations failed to result in an agreement and on November 3rd Port Chester 
commenced a condemnation proceeding.  Plaintiffs requested that the village 
withdraw the proceedings, but after holding special meetings, the request was 
denied.   
 
In its January, 2004 petition to the district court, the plaintiffs argued that 
the village and G & S “conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of the use of their property 
in order to pursue their own private interests—specifically, their development 
plans with Walgreens—rather than the interests of the public.”   Didden, 304 F. 
Supp. 2d at 557.   On January 23, 2004, the district court denied plaintiffs’ 
request for a preliminary injunction.  On May 24, 2004, the district court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The court held that all 
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of plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.  The three-year statute of limitations period 
applicable to § 1983 claims began to run when Port Chester made its public 
purpose finding on July 14, 1999.  At that point, plaintiffs had reason to know of 
the basis for their injury because they were fully aware that the finding of public 
purpose exposed their property to the possibility of condemnation.  Accordingly, 
the triggering of the statute of limitations was not delayed until November, 2003, 
when G & S allegedly attempted to exact a cash payment from plaintiffs. 
 
Plaintiffs claimed they were not aware that EDPL § 207 required that 
appeals of public purpose findings be made within 30 days. The plaintiffs 
conceded that they received notice of the public hearing in July of 1999 and, 
under law, were charged with knowledge of the procedures established for 
judicial review. Since they received notice and failed to challenge the village’s 
public purpose findings, they lost their right to contest the validity of those 
findings.    The district court also found that plaintiffs’ claim that G & S attempted 
to extort payments from the plaintiffs had no legal significance.  It noted that “[a]s 
Plaintiffs themselves assert in their Complaint, G & S . . . ha[s] the authority 
under the LADA to obligate Port Chester to pursue condemnation of properties 
within the Project’s boundaries.  Threats to enforce a party’s legal rights are not 
actionable.”  Didden, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 390.  
 
On April 5, 2006, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
on the statute of limitations noting that the plaintiffs would not have succeeded 
even if their action were not time-barred.  Didden v. Port Chester, No. 04-3485-
CV, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8653 (2d Cir. April 5, 2006).  Citing Kelo v. New 
London, the court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the village.  Id., at 
*5.  In Kelo, the court noted: “Just as we decline to second-guess the City’s 
considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline 
to second-guess the City’s determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in 
order to effectuate the project.” Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488).  Because G & 
S was fully authorized to proceed with the acquisition of the plaintiff’s property 
under the plan, its position in voluntary negotiations undertaken with the plaintiffs 
was not “an unconstitutional exaction in the form of extortion.” Didden, No. 04-
3485-CV, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8653, at *5.  In other words, the district court 
was correct in finding that any attempt by G & S to exact a cash payment from 
the plaintiffs did not constitute a cognizable injury.   
 
Conclusion: 
 
 Some critics of the Didden case raise concerns that designated 
redevelopers have too much power under the urban renewal process.  G & S 
used that power, they assert, to advance its private interests to the prejudice of 
those of the plaintiffs.  G & S had negotiated with CVS and failed, then turned to 
Walgreens. Meanwhile, the Didden group successfully concluded a deal with 
CVS, secured approvals from other local agencies, and was ready to proceed 
with the development of the pharmacy. Surely the law that permitted G & S to 
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prevail in this private sector struggle advances the private interests of one 
developer over another rather than advancing a public purpose as required by 
the Fifth Amendment.   
 
The case, when removed from its statutory underpinnings and history, can 
be cast as the use of public authority to elevate one private party’s interest over 
that of another. Viewed against the backdrop of decades of urban decline and a 
statutory structure that provides tools designed to aid the difficult task of urban 
regeneration, however, perceptions change. How can area-wide redevelopment 
be achieved if private redevelopers are not given the ability to work at a sufficient 
scale of operations to reverse decades of blight?  How can this ability be limited 
to protect the private rights of owners within designated areas without 
compromising the market feasibility of redevelopment?  Every statutory 
amendment that affords greater protections must consider the tension between 
private rights and the greater public interest in urban revitalization.  
 
From a public policy perspective, what, if anything, is wrong with the 
procedures and authorities delegated to local governments under Articles 15 and 
15-A and the procedures for condemnation set forth in the EDPL?  Proposals for 
their reform include severe limitations on the use of eminent domain, more and 
better planning and public process, lengthier periods of public notice and statutes 
of limitation, and higher levels of compensation for the owners of condemned 
properties.  Each of these reforms has been advanced in the New York 
legislature since Kelo was decided. Each proposal raises legitimate questions 
about the tension between expeditious and cost-effective action to achieve area-
wide redevelopment and the rights of individual property owners.  
 
The Didden case provides an excellent opportunity to place the debate 
over eminent domain reform in its proper perspective.  G & S, and other 
redevelopers, are practical proxies for the public interest in urban redevelopment.  
Legal provisions that make it possible for redevelopers to build in accordance 
with publicly-approved plans, following a transparent public process, should not 
be seen as laws that promote private interests.  The attempt to charge the 
debate in this way obscures the legitimate and critical public stake in our urban 
places.   
 
The nation is slowly recovering from a long period of urban decay, which 
recovery is due in part to urban revitalization strategies like that adopted by the 
Village of Port Chester.  The certain consequences of climate change require 
greater concentration of urban settlements to conserve energy and mitigate 
carbon emissions. If our society does experience serious sea level rise, the law 
must provide a means of adaptation.  When legislatures hold extensive hearings 
to consider urban decay and redevelopment as they did in the 1950s and 1960s 
and prescribe a defined public process leading to urban renewal, the courts must 
defer to their findings and procedures.  This reflects our historical understanding 
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of the role of the courts and will serve us well as we confront new challenges 
appearing on the horizon.  
 
 
 
